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THEFREETRADE AGREEMENTPARADOX 
MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS* 
There is broad consensus that trade liberalisation is best achieved by negotiating 
reductions in trade barriers under the auspices of the World Trade Organization 
rounds of multilateral negotiations. Notwithstanding this consensus, Free Trade 
Agreements ("FTAs") have been proliferating at a rapid pace for many years now. The 
diversion of effort into negotiating FTAs, as well as the types of FTAs being negotiated, 
is undermining the ability to liberalise trade at the multilateral level. This article 
identifies this state of affairs as a paradox of sorts and seeks to explain the reasons for 
the paradox as well as to identify some potential solutions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
''The last dozen years have seen a proliferation of customs unions and free­
trade areas of unforeseen proportions. Such regional arrangements, far from 
being halfway houses on the road to non-discriminatory and freer trade, may 
be in direct conflict with those goals." These words nicely summarise the 
concerns academics and others are voicing today - yet the above was 
authored by Kenneth Dam in 1963 . 1 Thus the challenges posed by free trade 
agreements2 ("FTAs")3 are not new. The intractability of some of the 
problems, and the further· proliferation of FT As over the past several decades, 
have only served to heighten the uneasiness many feel with the current 
situation. 
FT As have been multiplying for several years now. Yet industry routinely 
complains that FTAs are "second best" and that the multilateral World Trade 
Organization ("WTO") system is the preferred route to trade liberalisation. 
Consumers and workers also express concerns about these arrangements. What 
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. 
K W Darn, "Regional Economic Arrangements and the GA TI: The Legacy of a 
Misconception" (1963) 30 U Chi L Rev 615,615. 
2 A free trade agreement is, in its purest form, an agreement between two or more countries 
that trade between them will be free - that is to say that each agreement member will lower 
its tariffs to zero for products being imported from the other member or members. Free trade 
agreements can also include commitments to liberalise non-tariff barriers to trade such as 
opportunities in the services sector and investment rules. In practice, as discussed below, free 
trade agreements often feature exceptions allowing tariffs and other barriers to be maintained 
for certain sensitive products or sectors, and can include long timeframes for members to 
fully reduce tariffs on the products covered. Nonetheless, the primary purpose of most free 
trade agreements is to enhance trade opportunities between members by reducing tariffs and 
other trade barriers in a faster and/or more comprehensive way than is likely to occur through 
multilateral trade negotiations. See generally John H Jackson, William J Davey, and Alan 0 
Sykes Jr, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text 
(4th ed, 2002) ch 1 1 . 
3 These agreements are variously referred to as RTAs (regional trade agreements), PTAs 
(preferential trade agreements), and FT As (free trade agreements). Although "RTA" may be 
the most commonly used term, it is not particularly accurate given the increasing number of 
agreements between countries from different regions. While "PTA" is perhaps the most 
comprehensive term, encompassing FT As, customs unions, and partial scope trade 
agreements, it also may suggest an inherent disapproval that this article does not seek to 
convey. Therefore, as the vast maJority of trade agreements today are free trade agreements, 
this article uses "FTA" as the general term to apply to all of these types of. agreements. 
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explains this seeming paradox? This article will explore thre� reasons why 
Ff As have become ubiquitous de�pite the widespread view that the WTO is 
the better way to achieve meaningful global reductions in trade barriers. Part II 
will set forth the paradox. Part ill will set forth three possible explanations for 
this phenomenon: first, that there is a "me too" effect occurring in which 
countries are responding defensively to the existence of other Ff As by joining 
their own bilateral agreements; second, that the current WTO mechanisms for 
reviewing Ff As are insufficient to prevent countries from entering into 
protectionist and/or politically motivated agreements; and third that there is a 
prisoner's dilemma at work whereby it is rational at present for countries to 
enter into Ff As despite the more efficient outcome that would be reached if 
countries eschewed FfAs in favour of liberalising trade through the WTO's 
multilateral system. Part IV will propose some possible solutions to the Ff A 
paradox. 
II. THE Ff A DISCONNECT 
The WTO is an international organisation that, through the collective 
agreements of its members, establishes rules governing international trade and 
enforces those rules through dispute settlement procedures. The WTO came 
into effect on 1 January 1995 and is the successor to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). The GATT, which dealt with trade in goods, is 
now incorporated into the WTO, and the WTO also includes newer rules 
governing other areas including intellectual property, services, and dispute 
settlement.4 One of the core principles of the GATT, and now the WTO, is that 
of most-favoured nation ("MFN"). This concept, enshrined in Article I o( the 
GATT, provides that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by 
any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties".5 In 
other words, WTO member countries are supposed to treat other member 
countries equally well in terms of providing market access in order to 
minimise instances of discrimination among members. 6 MFN treatment 
4 Although the GATI has been incorporated into the WTO, the original provisions are still 
referred to and properly referenced as articles of GATI. Thus this article refers to "GATI 
consistency" wh�n discussing GATI Article XXN. Unlike the WTO, the GATT was only a 
treaty and not recognised as an international organisation. Its signatories were therefore 
referred to as "contracting parties" rather than members. The WTO however is an 
international organisation and its signatories are referred to as members. GATI contracting 
parties had to agree to an entire package of trade-related agreements in order to accede to the 
new WTO in 1995. At present the WTO has 148 members accounting for approximately 
ninety-seven per cent of world trade. For additional background on the GA TI and WTO, see 
generally John H Jackson, William J Davey, and Alan 0 Sykes Jr, Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations - Cases, Materials and Text on the National and 
International Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations (4th ed, 2002); Andreas F 
Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (2002); and <www.wto.org>. 
5 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments -
Results of the Uruguay Round (1994) vol 31, Annex 1, Art 1; (1994) 33 ILM 1153. 
6 Other purposes of MFN are to reduce the transaction costs that result from having different 
import criteria for products depending on their country of origin and to reduce tensions that 
may result between countries as a result of differential treatment. See J H Jackson, 
''Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations" (1996) 27 Law & Pol'y lnt'l Bus 873, 875. 
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originally applied primarily to goods, but has now been expanded to services 
in the form of the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services 
("GATS").7 
Notwithstanding the importance placed on the MFN principle, the 
GATT/WTO system has long provided for various exceptions to the 
application of this core concept. For example, the GATT Enabling Clause 
provides a legal basis for developed countries to give differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries than they give to other developed 
countries. 8 In the absence of the Enabling Clause, developed countries would 
not be permitted to give more favourable access to developing countries 
because of their obligation under MFN to treat all members equally. 
For purposes of this article, the most important exceptions to the MFN rule 
are Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS, which allow for 
the creation of customs unions and free-trade areas. The GATT required a 
provision such as Article XXIV so that the European Economic Community 
("EEC"), which was simultaneously being negotiated, could exist in a manner 
that would be consistent with the new international trading regime.9 As a 
customs union, the EEC violated the MFN principle by imposing duties on 
goods imported from non-EEC members but not on goods imported from 
countries within the EEC.10 It was thus necessary for the GATT to provide an 
exception to the MFN requirement for customs unions and FT As. 
Article XXIV permits countries to apply tariffs on a discriminatory basis - by 
favouring their Ff A partners with lower rates than other members - so long 
as the conditions of that Article are satisfied. Article XXIV requires 1) that an 
Ff A or customs union reduce or remove barriers on "substantially all" trade 
between the parties to the agreement, 11 and 2) that the "duties and other. 
7 The GATS Agreement states that "each [WfO] Member shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no Jess 
favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country". 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments -
Results of the Uruguay Round (1994) vol 31, Annex lB, Art II( I). 
8 The Enabling Clause, more formally known as the "Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries", was 
adopted under GATT in 1979. The Enabling Clause is exercised primarily through the 
Generalised System of Preferences ("GSP"), under which developed countries can offer 
preferential market access (such as zero or very low tariff rates) to developing countries even 
when such access is non-reciprocal and is not extended to all developing countries. In 
addition, the Enabling Clause provides the legal basis for developing countries to enter into 
regional arrangements amongst themselves that do not rise to the level of comprehensiveness 
Of an FrA, and for the Global System of Trade Preferences ("GSTP") under which various 
developing countries grant each other trade concessions that are not extended to the wro 
membership at large. See generally, WfO Trade and Development Committee, Work on 
Special and Differential Provisions, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 
October 2005). 
9 S M Cone ill, "'The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored Nation 
Treatment and 'Imperial Preference'" (2005) 26 Mich J lnt'l L 563,567. Customs unions entail 
the members dropping tariffs between themselves to zero and the setting of a common external 
tariff. In contrast, free trade agreements only affect tariffs between the signatories, but each 
signatory maintains its own tariff scheme for countries not party to the Fr A 
10 When Art XXIV was drafted in 1947, it only provided for customs unions; language 
providing for "free-trade area[s)" was added later. 
11 GATI, ArtXXIV:8. 
. l' 
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regulations of commerce" applied by Ff A members to WTO members outside 
the FI'A "shall not be higher or more restrictive" after the FI'A comes into 
effect than previously.12 
Customs unions and Ff As were envisioned as MFN exceptions that would 
be utilised only occasionally, and faithful to the purposes behind 
Article XXIVY :Instead, while customs unions have been relatively unusual,14 
Ff As have proliferated, and the agreements that have arisen by and large have 
not satisfied the requirements and purposes of Article XXIV. The WTO 
mechanism for ensuring that FI'As comply with Article XXIV has also been 
largely ineffective.15 As a result, there has been increasing criticism of FI'As 
and concern about their impact on the ability of the multilateral WTO system 
to continue to move forward with further trade liberalisation. 
The criticisms of FJ'As are many and varied. One argument, first raised in 
1950 by the noted economist Jacob Viner, cautions that arrangements such as 
customs unions and Ff As can be trade diverting rather than trade promoting. 1•6 
Trade diversion occurs when an Ff A has the effect of enhancing the exports of 
an Ff A member at the expense· of imports that were previously purchased 
from a country or countries not party to the Ff A. 
Others disfavour Ff As because they divert attention and resources away 
from multilateral liberalisation efforts under the WTO framework.17 As 
countries direct their efforts to negotiating Ff As, they may lack the drive - or 
for that matter the staff - to simultaneously work towards multilateral 
progress in the forum of the WTO. \8 As was stated in a recent WTO report, 
"the diversion of skilled and experienced negotiating resources into [FI'As) 
especially for developing nations and probably for rich countries also - is too 
12 Ibid, Art XXIV:5(b). The applicable provision for customs unions provides that duties and 
regulations "shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence" 
prior to the creation of the customs union. Also ibid, Art XXIV:5(a): this provision has 
sparked a number of interpretation problems. See Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GAIT Article 
XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 894-895. 
GATS, Art V contains provisions that differ slightly from those of GAIT, Art XXIV. 
13 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 21 ,  available 
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
14 As of 31 January, 2002 there were 162 FfAs in force; of these, only 13 were customs unions. 
Of the remainder, 115 were FrAs, 19 were agreements notified under the Enabling Clause, 
and 15 under Art V of GATS: WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Basic 
Information on Regional Trade Agreements, (WTIREGIW/44, 2002). 
15 See for example Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New 
Millenium (2004) 21, available online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
16 Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (1950) 44. 
17 For example, some in the United States have argued that United States businesses would 
have been better served by the government putting its negotiating resources into the 
multilateral WTO negotiations instead of negotiating Ff As with little economic benefit. See 
WTO, "Advisory Report Calls for WTO Push to End Tariffs to Counter Trade Preferences 
Threat" (2005) 22 ITR 7 1 .  
1 8  See P Sutherland, 'The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to th e  World 
Trading System- A Cosmopolitan Perspective" (2005) 8 J Int'l Econ L 363, 366. 
558 New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol21 
great to permit adequate focus on the multilateral stage."19 This problem is 
particularly acute for least developed and developing countries that may only 
have enough staff to engage in one trade negotiation at a time.20 If the entire 
government negotiating team is working on achieving an Ff A, there is simply 
no staff available to push for progress in the WTO forum. 
A further concern is the complexity and cost associated with the 
inconsistent rules of origin running through the multitude of FfAs. Such rules 
are necessary to determine which goods qualify for the preferential Ff A tariff 
rate and which do not. Applicable tariffs may vary significantly based on 
whether or not the country of origin for a given import is an FfA partner. This 
determination is straightforward for goods produced solely in one country 
from materials originating in that country. The situation becomes significantly 
more complex, however, when cotton from one country is woven in another, 
cut into garments in a third, and finished with appliques in a fourth. Different 
countries have different ways of determining the country of origin. The so­
called rules of origin problem is further complicated by the existence of Ff As 
with different rules of origin criteria. Country "A" may have different criteria 
under its FfA with "B" than it does under its FfA with "C". Jagdish Bhagwati 
has likened the tangle of overlapping obligations and alignments to a 
"spaghetti bowl" that "clutters up trade with discrimination depending on the 
'nationality' of a good".21 In addition to the clutter, there is significant expense 
involved in administering rules of origin in Ff As. 22 
Those concerned with development issues also have concerns about Ff As, 
arguing that developing countries have strength in numbers within the WTO 
- an advantage that is lost in bilateral negotiations. At least in the multilateral 
context the world's most economically vulnerable countries can and 
sometimes do band together for negotiation purposes.23 But the advantages of 
being a part of the LDC Group or Africa Group are lost in the context of a one-
19 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 23, available 
online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
20 Ibid, 23. But seeM Ewing-Chow, "Southeast Asia and Free Trade Agreements: WTO Plus or 
Bust?" (2004) 8 Sing Ybk of lnt'l L 193, 198 (arguing that the PTA process had led to 
Singapore increasing the size of its trade negotiating team and adding to its overall trade 
negotiating expertise). 
21 J Bhagwati, "US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas" in Jagdish Bhagwati and 
Anne 0 Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (1995) 2-3. 
22 SeeD Palmeter, "Some Inherent Problems with Free Trade Agreements" ( 1996) 27 Law & 
Pol'y Int'l Bus 991, 996 (noting that the cost of demonstrating country of origin led exporters 
of up to twenty-five per cent of the trade from individual European Free Trade Association 
countries that would presumably have been eligible for preferential access to the European 
Union to forego that preferential rate and just pay the standard MFN rate of duty). 
23 The developing countries have organised themselves into different coalitions, including the 
African Group and the Least-Developed Countries ("LDC") Group. The countries 
comprising these alliances sometimes see their interests as aligned and negotiate collectively 
under the framework of their Group. For example, the Africa Group and LDC Group have 
worked in concert on reducing barriers to access to developed markets for textiles and 
clothing. See for example WTO, "Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries", available 
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). In other circumstances however 
these countries do not share common interests and negotiate in their individual capacities. 
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on-one negotiation with a developed country trading partner.24 There is also a 
fear that developing countries will be compelled to make major concessions in 
exchange for fairly limited concessions from developed country trading 
partners. 25 
Furthermore, because FT As are preferential in nature - giving more 
beneficial trade access to those in the agreement than to those excluded from it 
-some warn that as FTAs proliferate, the core GATT and WTO principle of 
MFN has been eroded to the point that it can be more accurately characterised 
as LFN, or least-favoured nation.26 A startling illustration of this phenomenon 
is the fact that the European Union ("EU")27 has so many preferential 
arrangements that only nine WTO member countries fail to qualify for 
treatment more favourable than MFN.28 All other WTO members have some 
24 See for example P Drahos, "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the 
WTO" (2003) 8 International Negotiation 79 (arguing that due to disparities in bargaining 
power, developing countries would do better to negotiate in groups within the WTO than to 
enter into bilateral negotiations with developed countries). Some question whether trade 
liberalisation of any kind is an appropriate strategy. See Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand 
Experiment (1995), arguing that New Zealand's unilateral trade liberalisation efforts had a 
highly negative effect on the country. A detailed consideration of the arguments against trade 
liberalisation is beyond the scope of this article. 
25 In the Australasian context, Jane Kelsey has argued that the Pacific Island countries have 
been heavily pressured to negotiate the regional trade agreements known as PICTA (Pacific 
Island Countries Trade Agreement) and PACER (Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations). She argues that the power imbalance is felt especially keenly in PACER, which 
features tiny, subsistence economies alongside the developed nations Australia and New 
Zealand. See J Kelsey, "World Trade and Small Nations in the South Pacific Region" (2005) 
14 Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 247; J Kelsey, "Big Brothers Behaving Badly: 
The hnplications for the Pacific Islands of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations" in Pacific Network on Globalisation, Interim Report (April 2004). See also 
P Drahos, "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the WTO" (2003) 
8 International Negotiation 79, 80 (using the example of the Jordan-United States FTA as an 
example of a developing country agreeing to unfavourable terms in the context of bilateral 
negotiations with a more powerful developed country). 
26 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 19, available 
online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). See also P Sutherland, ''The Doha 
Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the World Trading System- A Cosmopolitan 
Perspective" (2005) 8 J Int'l Econ L 363, 366 ("the reality is that one of the central pillars of 
the WTO- most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment- has been undermined to the point that 
it may become meaningless."). 
27 The European Economic Community was renamed the European Community and 
incorporated into the European Union in 1992 pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on 
European Union (EU), 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) I, 3 1  I.L.M. 253). The European 
Union is a WTO member, as are its twenty-five constituent countries. This article refers to 
the European Economic Community or EEC when discussing events preceding the creation 
of the European Union, and otherwise to the European Union or EU. 
28 The only WTO members to whom the EU does not provide preferential market access above 
and beyond its MFN commitments 
·
are Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, 
China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States. Report by the 
Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: 
Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 2 1, available online at 
<www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
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sort of preferential access to EU markets above and beyond the applicable 
MFN access.29 
It is not only academics that have concerns about FTAs. In the course of 
some recent research into non-tariff barriers being faced by New Zealand 
exporters of agricultural products, representatives across the sector appeared to 
be more,or less united in their view that while they would benefit from the 
New .zealand-Thailand FTA or from an FTA with China, what they really 
wanted was progress in the WT0.30 Although FTAs are useful to the extent 
they provide improved market access, they are nonetheless "second-best". The 
WTO is the preferred means of trade liberalisation because multilateral tariff 
reductions provide a broader range of improved access. 31 
Of course there can be positive aspects to FTAs. Under ideal 
circumstances, they can provide opportunities not presently available under the 
multilateral negotiating regime. For example a country such as New Zealand 
that is willing to liberalise trade barriers has the opportunity through FT As to 
achieve meaningful cuts in tariff levels and other trade barriers more quickly 
and comprehensively than would be possible under the multilateral system. 
Likewise a country may, like Singapore, be anxious to enter into FTAs to 
reduce as many trade barriers as it can as quickly as possible, and to pursue 
opportunities to commit to higher levels of trade liberalisation than have been 
agreed to in the WT0.32 For example, the New Zealand-Singapore FT A 
contains provisions making it more difficult to limit imports through the 
imposition of antidumping duties than would be the case under the Agreement 
on Antidumping.33 Still other countries such as Mexico may find that they 
experience benefits such as increased foreign direct investment as a result of 
their FTA relationships.34 FTAs can also provide the ability to pursue trade 
liberalisation in areas not yet covered in a comprehensive way by the WTO, 
such as e-commerce, services, and investment issues. 35 The difficulty arises 
29 Europe's other trading partners have access to the European market that is more beneficial 
than MFN, by virtue of various agreements including those covered by GATI Art XXIV, the 
Enabling Clause, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and other schemes. Report 
by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the 
WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 21, available online 
at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
30 This research was conducted by the author and Associate Professor Gordon Anderson of the 
Victoria University of Wellington Law School. Additional findings of that research will be 
the subject of a future joint article. 
31 See "Regional Free Trade Deals 'Second Best' " (3 May 2005) The Dominion Post 
Wellington C6. This article summarises an interview with Fonterra Chief Executive Andrew 
Ferrier and reflects Ferrier's view that while FT As could be useful, they were a "second­
best" alternative to liberalisation via the WTO. 
32 M Ewing-Chow, "Southeast Asia and Free Trade Agreements: WTO Plus or Bust?" (2004) 
8 Sing Ybk of lnt'l L 193, 196. 
33 Specifically, the New Zealand-Singapore FTA raises the de minimis threshold for a finding of 
dumping to five per cent of the export price, as compared with the two per cent threshold 
provided for in the Agreement on Antidumping. See ibid, 201. 
34 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 63, available 
online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
35 B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Agreements? A 
Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWU 667, 686. 
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when the new subject areas encompassed in FTAs are not those that will lead 
to the liberalising of trade such as the areas just mentioned, but instead are 
topics such as labour and the environment, which will likely serve as 
protectionist features dampening trade flows. 
The problem is that it is the exception rather than the rule to find an FT A 
that effects a true reduction of trade barriers without qualifications, conditions, 
or flat out exclusions. Indeed, the WTO has concluded that many FT As do not 
show strong evidence of trade creation and that most do not realise deeper 
trade integration than that achieved through the multilateral framework. 36 
Countries tend to continue to protect in their Ff As the products for which they 
provide the most protection in the WTO context. Thus, products with high 
MFN-rate tariffs still tend to have high tariffs even in the context of an Ff A.37 
At times countries have, despite preferring trade liberalisation through the 
multilateral system, pursued FfAs when the GATT or WTO has been at a 
relative standsti11.38 For example, the impetus in 1983 for the United States to 
enter into bilateral negotiations with Canada was the failure in November 1982 
to obtain agreement from Europe and the developing nations to begin a new 
round of GATT multilateral negotiations. 39 Likewise, many attribute the recent 
spate of Ff As to the failed Seattle and Cancun rninisterials and the lack of 
progress in the current Doha Round of WTO negotiations. 40 Some trade 
liberalisation is better than none, goes the thinking.41 There is some appeal to 
this argument. If the FT As that were entered into created patches of true trade 
liberalisation, such Ff As would presumably help nudge barriers down on a 
multilateral level whether or not negotiations were ongoing at the time the 
Ff A was negotiated. This was arguably the case when the creation of the EEC 
spurred the United States to initiate several successive rounds of GATT 
negotiations. 42 Countries may also enter into FT As as an insurance policy of 
36 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 54-55, 
available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). The dispute over 
whether Ff As are generally trade diverting or trade creating is an important one; however, a 
detailed consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
37 Ibid, 61. 
38 See for example D Palmeter, "Some Inherent Problems with Free Trade Agreements" (1996) 
27 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus 991, 992. 
39 J Bhagwati, "US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas" in Jagdish Bhagwati 
and Anne 0 Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (1995) 9. 
40 See for example P Sutherland, "The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the 
World Trading System - A Cosmopolitan Perspective" (2005) 8 J Int'l Econ L 363, 366; 
R Bhala and D A Gantz, "WTO Case Review 2004" (2005) 22 Ariz J Int'l & Comp· L 99, 
105-106. 
4 1  The decision t o  seek Fr As  does not necessarily indicate a lack o f  commitment t o  the Doha 
Round. See B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements? A Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWLJ 667, 679 (documenting the United 
States' repeated efforts to jump start the Doha Round agriculture negotiations notwithstanding 
its increased FfA activity in recent years). Even if the commitment is present, however, the 
reality is that the existence of so many Ff As makes the task of negotiating agreements 
among 148 countries all the more challenging. 
42 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 64, available 
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
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sorts against the possibility that their trading partners will become more 
protectionist in the future.43 And FfAs can additionally strengthen regional 
and political relationships, and as such can serve an important, albeit non­
economic, function.44 
On the other hand, to the extent that Ff As are used as a means of imposing 
trade distorting measures rather than avoiding them - a. phenomenon that is 
increasingly frequent - it will be all the more difficult to get countries to 
agree to dismantle such measures in the WTO context. For example, numerous 
Ff As have excluded agriculture largely or entirely from their scope while 
making concessions in other areas. If the WTO is to be the forum for countries 
to agree to lower their agricultural tariffs, that task has been made more 
difficult because countries have already obtained benefits through FfAs that 
could have been used as incentives to lower agricultural tariffs.45 WTO 
members are behaving in effect like children being allowed to have their 
dessert before the rest of the meal. Without the sweets available as a 
bargaining chip - and indeed with bellies already partly full - it will 
inevitably be a heightened challenge to get the members to sit down and make 
their way through the big plate of spinach that remains. 
Some have argued that the WTO and regionalism are additive, meaning 
that both can and should be pursued simultaneously with positive effect. For 
example, then United States Treasury Under-Secretary Lawrence Summers 
considered all types of trade liberalisation to be positives, arguing that: 
"Economists should maintain a strong, but rebuttable presumption in favour of 
all lateral reductions in trade· barriers, whether they be multi-, uni-, bi-, tri-, 
plurilateral."46 Others have reached conflicting conclusions regarding the effect 
of regionalism on the multilateral system.47 However, it seems likely that 
pursuing an undifferentiated strategy of liberalisation on multiple fronts would 
have a negative impact on the multilateral regime for multiple reasons. Unless 
efforts were being made to reduce all tariffs to zero everywhere, the 
43 · B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Agreements? A 
Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWU 667, 678. 
44 J H Jackson, "Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations" (1996) 27 Law & Pol'y lnt'l 
Bus 873, 874-875. 
45 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 65, available 
online. at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
46 L Summers, "Regionalism and the World Trading System" in Policy Implications of Trade 
and Currency Zones, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas (1991), quoted in J Bhagwati, "US 
Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas" in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne 0 
Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (1995) 8. Summers 
went on to become Secretary of the Treasury and is currently the president of Harvard 
University. 
47 B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Agreements? A 
Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWU 667, 675-676; M Ewing-Chow, "Southeast Asia and 
Free Trade Agreements: WTO Plus or Bust?" (2004) 8 Sing Ybk of lnt'l L 193; C M Bruner, 
"Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of Regionalism: The 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)" (2002) 33 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 1, 63-64 
(summarising competing views on whether FTAs are "stepping stones or stumbling blocks" 
(citation omitted)). 
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multilateral efforts cannot help but suffer as a result of new overlapping, 
contradictory agreements.48 
Although there are commentators on both sides of the issue, the consensus 
seems to be that Ff As are at best of mixed benefit, and at worst a serious 
problem.49 
Yet Ff As have been proliferating for several years now. Of the 170 
notified agreements in force as of early 2005, forty-three were notified in the 
period January 2004 to February 2005 alone.50 The WTO has been notified of 
twenty more agreements in the process of being ratified and seventy others 
under negotiations. 51 Although some WTO members have more actively 
pursued FfAs than others, the trend is all but universal. In fact there is only a 
single WTO member - Mongolia- that is not involved in any sort of Ff A. 52 
So even though the WTO is believed to be the best way to achieve trade 
liberalisation, WTO members are flocking to Ff As, which are seen as second 
best. The next section will suggest three potential explanations for this 
seemingly paradoxical behaviour. 53 
Ill. IF Ff AS ARE SECOND BEST, WHY ARE THEY CONTINUING TO MULTIPLY? 
Countries are evidently deciding that, notwithstanding their general preference 
for liberalising trade in the multilateral context, there are other considerations 
that militate in favour of pursuing Ff As. This part suggests three possible 
reasons for this phenomenon. 
48 Jagdish Bhagwati has also argued that NAFTA and other FTA negotiations can spark more 
trade opposition in the domestic arena than would be generated in the context of WTO 
liberalisations. In the absence of NAFTA, Americans would not have had the same fears 
about job loss and lower wages. The Uruguay Round did not frighten developed country 
citizens in the same way, because the multilateral process covered so many issues and 
countries, attention was not directed towards the wage or job benefits that might accrue to 
large poor countries such as India. J Bhagwati, "Preferential Trade Agreements: The Wrong 
Road" (1996) 27 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus 865, 871. 
49 For a more theoretical analysis of whether FTAs are a complement or an alternative to 
multilateral trade liberalisation, see N N Tiny, "Regionalism and the WTO: Mutual 
Accommodation at the Global Trading System" (2005) 11 Int'l TL Rev 126. 
50 J Crawford and R V Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements 
(2005) l ,  available online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
51 Ibid, 1. When an FT A is negotiated among WTO members, the parties are supposed to notify 
the WTO of the agreement by submitting documentation to the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements ("CRTA"). The CRTA will be discussed in more detail in part ill. There 
are additional FT As that have not followed the notification process, and it is difficult to track 
the exact number of such agreements. Z Hafez, ''Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and 
the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 916. 
52 J Crawford and R V Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements 
(2005) 1, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
· 
53 See "Regional Free Trade Deals 'Second Best' " (3 May 2005) The Dominion Post 
Wellington C6, reporting that Renato Ruggiero, former director-general of the WTO, had 
noted that "globalization is the word on everyone's lips, yet regional agreements have never 
been so popular". 
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A. The "Me Too" Effect 
The first reason is what this article calls the "me too" effect. When A and B 
enter into an Ff A, there are shifts in comparative advantage whereby A and B 
are now more competitive in each other's markets than previously as a result 
of the reduction in tariffs between A and B. At the same time, other countries' 
exporters become less competitive in A's and B's markets because their 
products are subject to higher tariffs in A's market than products from B are, 
and to higher tariffs in B's market than A's products are. For example, Japan's 
recent bilateral Ff A with Mexico will result in increased access to the 
Japanese market for many Mexican agricultural products. This will put 
Australian exporters of those agricultural products at a disadvantage in the 
Japanese market relative to their previous position.54 These shifts in 
comparative advantage therefore create powerful incentives for additional 
countries to seek FfAs with A and/or B.55 
The New Zealand-Thailand FfA is arguably an example of the "me too" 
effect. The impetus for this seemed to have originated largely from Australia 
having negotiated an FT A with Thailand. New Zealand and Australia were 
previously on an equal footing in the Thai market as they were subject to the 
same tariffs on their agricultural exports. The Australia-Thailand FTA changed 
this dynamic. New Zealand could see that, by virtue of the FTA, Australian 
agricultural exporters would gain a leg up over New Zealand exporters in the 
Thai market because they would be subject to lower or entirely removed 
tariffs. As a result, New Zealand had a strong incentive to take a "me too" 
approach and seek its own Ff A with Thailand. This phenomenon is replicated 
again and again in the region and indeed around the world. There can be little 
question that Australia's eagerness to negotiate an FfA with China is in part 
due to New Zealand's progress in negotiating its own China FfA. Likewise, 
the Australia-United States FTA may make New Zealand more anxious to 
have its own FT A with the United States. 
The "me too" effect is problematic in part, as previously described, because 
countries "are going bilateral instead of multilateral. But it is also of concern 
because existing Ff As may in some instances be held out as a model or 
template for new FfA negotiations.56 A problem arises when FfAs feature 
provisions that are widely divergent from WTO obligations. Examples of this 
include the labour and environment provisions of the United States-Jordan 
Ff A and the ultra-high intellectual property protections found in the Australia­
United States FfA. It is to be expected that the United States will attempt to 
54 See B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Agreements? 
A Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWU 667, 688 for a discussion of the Japan-Mexico 
bilateral FT A. 
55 This phenomenon has also been called "domino regionalism". See WTO, World Trade 
Report 2003 (2003) 50, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
56 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTQ: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 23, available 
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). But see M Ewing-Chow, 
"Southeast Asia and Free Trade Agreements: WTO Plus or Bust?" (2004) 8 Sing Ybk of 
Int'l L 193, 198, arguing that templates are useful in that they have increased the similarities 
between different FT As and that therefore the feared jumble of conflicting trade rules has not 
come to pass. 
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replicate these provisions in its future FT As. And to the extent that such 
provisions become more widespread, via the use of template terms, the United 
States and other countries insisting upon such features may be in a stronger 
position to insist upon their inclusion on the negotiating agenda for future 
WTO rounds. The eminent members of the Consultative Panel that recently 
issued a report on the state of the WTO opined that "if such requirements 
cannot be justified at the front door of the WTO they probably should not be 
encouraged to enter through the side door".57 Jagdish Bhagwati argues this was 
precisely what the United States had in mind when it insisted on the inclusion 
of environmental and labour provisions in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement ("NAFTA"). Demands for such provisions had been fended off in 
the GATT, but of course the United States had a much easier time convincing 
its weaker neighbour in the context of one-on-one negotiations. 58 
Another concern is that having a template of sorts greatly reduces 
transaction costs, thus making FT As less and less burdensome to negotiate. 
Given the increasing complexities of negotiating each successive WTO round, 
the cookie-cutter FT A is an easy sell, particularly when proffered by powerful 
countries such as the United States to weaker countries with limited resources 
to devote to trade negotiations. Also, one of the benefits of having an 
institution such as the WTO is the reduction in transaction costs of having a 
negotiating framework in place. To the extent certain FT As are used as 
templates, this will lessen the appeal of liberalisation via the WTO. 
B. FTAs That Have Objectives Other Than Reducing Trade Barriers 
A second cause of the paradox is the tendency for countries to use FT As for 
means other than trade promotion.59 Indeed, many FTAs seem designed in 
large part to further political or even protectionist goals. 
1. Non-economic motivations 
Some agreements reflect political rather than economic motivations. The 
economic synergies between the United States and Jordan, for example, are far 
from apparent. What is clear is that Jordan is a moderate Arab country that has 
stood by the United States' side throughout the various conflicts in the Middle 
East and has reached a peace agreement with Israel. 60 The FT A is a reward to 
57 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 23, available 
online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). The members of the Consultative 
Board were Peter Sutherland (Chairman), Jagdish Bhagwati, Kwesi Botchwey, Niall 
FitzGerald, Koichi Hamada, John H Jackson, Celso Lafer, and Thierry de Montbrial. 
58 Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne 0 Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade 
Agreements (1995)12-13. 
59 See for example Q Kong, "China's WTO Accession and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: 
The Perspective of a Chinese Lawyer" (2004) 7 J Int'l Econ L 839, 843-844 (identifying 
political aspirations and the desire to have an impact on international economic rule-making 
as two of China's motivations for wanting to enter into an FTA with ASEAN). 
60 The Treaty of Peace Between The State of Israel and The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was 
entered into on 26 October, 1994. A copy of the treaty text may be accessed from 
<www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
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Jordan for its loyalty,61 and provides an opportunity for the United States to 
impose some terms in the Ff A that it would like to press on other trading 
partners going forward. Likewise, while the United States-Singapore FfA has 
some economic purpose to it, the timing of its signing - ahead of the 
originally scheduled signing of the United States-Chile FfA - had everything 
to do with politics and nothing to do with trade.62 
2. Excluding sensitive sectors 
While Ff As are supposed to reduce barriers between trading partners, in 
practice many FfAs contain terms that are trade-inhibiting. When developed 
countries form an Ff A regarding trade in goods, they are required to eliminate 
tariffs and other trade-restrictive regulations of commerce on "substantially all 
the trade" in principle within a ten-year period as required under Article XXIV 
of the GATT. There is no consensus on what "substantially all the trade" 
means. Some have argued that "substantially all" should be measured in 
quantitative terms, meaning a determination based on the percentage of trade 
of the members to the agreement. Others have instead taken the position that 
"substantially all" should be determined through a qualitative assessment, 
meaning that·all major sectors of trade should be included in the agreement.63 
Notwithstanding the numerous occasions on which the meaning of 
"substantially all the trade" was debated to no conclusion in the GATT era, the 
Uruguay Round negotiations did not provide a definitive answer. The 
Preamble to the Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV provides: 
"Such contribution is increased if the elimination between the constituent 
territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all 
trade, and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded."64 This language 
appears merely to state the obvious· and h.as not been read as providing any 
definitive guidance. 65 
Article XXIV has only been examined substantively in one dispute brought 
before the WTO, the Turkey-Textiles case, and that case failed to shed 
61 See M Nsour, "Fundamental Facets of  the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement: 
E-Commerce, Dispute Resolution, and Beyond" (2004) 27 Fordham Int'l U 742, 742 
(identifying the United States' interest in entering into an FT A and other economic 
agreements with Jordan as being "[d]ue to Jordan's continuous adherence to peace"). See 
also C B Picker, "Regional Trade Agreements v the WTO: A Proposal for Reform of Article 
XXIV to Counter this Institutional Threat" (2005) 26 Uni of Penn J Int'l Bus L 267, 278 
(identifying non-economic rationales for the FT As the United States has entered into in the 
Middle East). 
62 See S M Cone III, "The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored 
Nation Treatment and 'Imperial Preference' " (2005) 26 Mich J Int'l L 563, 576. Singapore 
was explicitly rewarded for its support of the United States in the Iraq war, while the signing 
of the Chilean agreement was delayed as a punishment for Chile's failure to support the 
United States in that war. Australia may have also jumped the queue as a result of its support 
for the United States' action in Iraq. 
63 Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on 
RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 892. 
64 Preamble to the Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV, para 4. 
65 Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on 
RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 893. 
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significant light on the issue. The Appellate Body's attempt to clarify the 
meaning of "substantially all the trade" is regrettably lacking:66 
Neither the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES nor the WTO Members have ever 
reached an agreement on the interpretation of the term "substantially" in this 
provision. It is clear, though, that "substantially all the trade" is not the same as all 
the trade, and also that "substantially all the trade" is something considerably more 
than merely some of the trade. 
It is no surprise that Turkey-Textiles did little to clarify the issue. Because 
there is no consensus as to what "substantially all the trade" requires, 
interpretations vary from one country to another. Many agreements carve out 
significant portions of sensitive sectors. For example, Australia has agreed to 
limit the scope of services covered i,n its FT A with Thailand, and New Zealand 
has also agreed to largely exclude services from its Thai FTA.67 These types of 
carve-outs are problematic because it will presumably be more difficult for 
other countries going forward to get concessions from Thailand on 
liberalisation of services than it would have been in the absence of the New 
Zealand and Australian FT As. 68 
3. WTO-plus provisions and non-trade objectives 
Other agreements raise additional concerns by providing coverage on a WTO­
plus basis, or by including what have been called "non-trade" objectives, such 
as undertakings to protect labour rights and the environment. 69 An example of 
the former is the Australia-United States FT A, which provides for intellectual 
property protections far above what the WTO's intellectual property 
agreement, TRIPS, requires. These provisions have significantly impacted 
Australia's ability to provide affordable access to pharmaceuticals through its 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and have come under significant criticism.70 
Similarly, the United States-Morocco FTA institutionalises the controversial 
practice of "evergreening" whereby patents must be registered on existing 
drugs if a "new use" for the drugs is identified. This practice allows patent 
holders to obtiun additional patent protection above that required under the 
66 WTO, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ( 1999) 
WT/DS34/ABIR, AB-1999-5, para 48 (Report of the Appellate Body), [emphases in the 
original]. 
67 These limitations can arise in the context of FfAs that are narrowly drawn but also ones that 
are largely comprehensive. Even within a broad-ranging FfA a "positive listings" approach 
may be adopted for certain sectors, whereby the only areas that are liberalised within the 
sector are those that are specifically identified and scheduled. 
68 It is of course also possible, as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official has suggested 
to the author, that the United States may be able to push New Zealand's potential FrA 
partners to agree to certain liberalising measures that New Zealand will then be able to insist 
upon as well, in its own future negotiations. 
69 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 23, available 
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005) .. 
70 B Lokuge, TA Faunce, and R Denniss, A Backdoor to Higher Medicine Prices? Intellectual 
Property and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (2003); C Arup, "The United States­
Australia Free Trade Agreement - the Intellectual Property Chapter" (2004) 15(4) Aus Intell 
Prop J 205, 222-224. 
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TRIPS Agreement. 7 1  Likewise, concerns have been raised about the increased 
intellectual property protections provided in the United States-Chile and 
United States-Singapore FT As. 72 
Criticisms have also been levelled at FT As that contain undertakings 
pertaining to environmental and labour protections. Examples of such 
agreements include the Ubited States' FTAs first with Mexico and Canada 
(under NAFfA) and more recently with Jordan, Australia, Chile, and 
Singapore.73 To the extent that FTAs are used to import into the free trade 
realm requirements that increase rather than decrease trade barriers, such FT As 
are clearly undermining the multilateral process of attempting to liberalise 
trade.74 The introduction of environmental and labour requirements that are 
expensive to satisfy will have the additional undesirable effect of removing 
some of the comparative advantage previously enjoyed by poorer countries.75 
For now there is nothing to stop countries from entering into these types of 
FTAs. FTAs are subject to examination and consensus-based assessment by 
the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements ("CRT A"). The CRT A 
has more of a political than a legal function, however. It does not exercise any 
meaningful oversight over FT As at present and as such has failed to curtail this 
problem. To be sure, the opinions expressed at the CRTA reveal sharp 
divisions between party countries to various FT As and non-party countries 
over the GATT consistency of the agreements: Those belonging to a particular 
FTA assert that it is consistent with the GATT, while those outside it insist 
otherwise; the resulting CRT A report thus ends up presenting the two opposing 
arguments in most cases. But because the CRT A operates on a consensus 
basis, FTAs can and do go into effect with the question of GATT consistency 
unsettled. 
C. A Game Theory Explanation: FTAs as a New Prisoner 's Dilemma . 
The FT A paradox is perhaps best explained as a form of prisoner' s  dilemma. 
The prisoner's dilemma illustrates a set of circumstances under which both 
parties to a dilemma consistently choose one option, which results in a less 
favourable outcome than had they both chosen the opposing option. The 
71 A Cosbey, Sober Reflection: Considering the Rush to Regionalism (Trade Knowledge 
Network paper, May 2005) 8, available online at <http://www.tradeknowledgenetwork.net> 
(last accessed 15 November 2005). •' 
72 See for example, Testimony of Gawain Kripke, Senior Policy Advisor, Oxfarn America, 
(before the Subcommittee on Trade of the US House Committee on Ways and Means on. the 
Implementation of US Bilateral Free Trade Agreements with Singapore and Chile, 10 June 
2003), available online at <www.oxfamarnerica.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
73 Testimony of Jagdish Bhagwati, (before Senate Finance Committee, The Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement: The Wrong Template, 20 March 2001); Report by the Consultative Board to the 
Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional 
�hallenges in the New Millenium (2004), available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 
20 October 2005) (arguing that such provisions should not be included in FTAs). Others 
object to the current provisions on the grounds that they do not go far enough: S M Cone ill, 
"The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored Nation Treatment 
and 'Imperial Preference'" (2005) 26 Mich J Int'l L 563, 577. 
74 See Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne 0 Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade 
Agreements (1995) 14. 
75 Ibid, 31. 
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original example goes something like this: two prisoners who committed a 
crime are confined separately and are unable to speak to one another. They 
have promised each other in advance not to confess. The prisoners are each 
told that if one confesses and the other does not, the confessor would be set 
free, while the prisoner that remained silent would receive a jail sentence of 
ten years. If both confess, each will serve two years in jail. If neither confesses, 
each will serve six months in jail. These parameters are set forth graphically 
below. 
Prisoner A Stays Silent Prisoner A Betrays 
Prisoner B Stays Silent Both serve 6 months B serves 1 0  years; A 
goes free 
Prisoner B Betrays A serves 10 years, B Both serve 2 years 
goes free 
The Nash equilibrium -the choice that rational parties always arrive at -
for the prisoner's dilemma is for both prisoners to betray or defect rather than 
to cooperate. Evaluating the options demonstrates why confessing is rational. 
Prisoner A realises that if he stays quiet, there are two possible outcomes. 
First, that prisoner B will stay quiet as well, resulting in a six-month jail 
sentence for A. Alternatively, B will confess, in which case A will serve ten 
years in jail. Prisoner A next determines the possible outcomes if he confesses. 
If he confesses and B does not, A goes free. If B confesses as well, they will 
both serve two years. Thus A sees the options as stay quiet (six months/ten 
years) or confess (free/two years). We can see therefore why A chooses to 
betray his co-conspirator and confess to the crime. Prisoner B goes through 
exactly the same analysis and also confesses. 
Although one can understand why both pris.oners defect, and can see that 
this decision is rational, this is not the Pareto optimal outcome.76 The outcome 
of both confessing is not optimal because the prisoners would each be better 
off if they both cooperated and stayed silent. 
In the trade context, this type of inefficient behaviour is not new. When left 
to their own devices, many countries see the safest choice as maximising 
exports while minimising imports. However, the more a country limits its 
imports, the more it will encourage other countries to erect barriers to its 
exports. Comparative advantage tells us though that the efficient outcome is 
for all countries to decline to restrict imports. Thus a prisoner's dilemma 
exists.77 Countries thus agreed to erect legal barriers - first through the GATT 
and now through the WTO - against protectionism in order to achieve 
economic benefits that would not have resulted based on the stand-alone 
choices of individual countries. As such, the formation of the GATT, followed 
by the WTO, can be seen as providing a solution to this particular prisoner's 
dilemma.78 Even though countries generally believed that overall economic 
76 A Pareto optimal or efficient outcome is one where the action taken has improved the 
situation of at least one party without making the other worse off. 
77 See for example, J Simser, "GATS and Financial Services: Redefining Borders" (1996) 
3 Buffalo Uni J of Int'l L 33, 40-41.  
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welfare would be maximised through global trade liberalisation, there was an 
incentive to agree to liberalise but then to cheat or defect. 
An example of this was the abuse of GATT Article XIX, which provides an 
"escape clause" allowing members to take emergency actions (on an MFN 
basis) to protect their industries against import surges. Countries adopted 
measures such as Voluntary Export Restraints ("VERs") and Orderly Market 
Arrangements ("OMAs") under the rubric of Article XIX These measures, 
while not specifically permitted under the escape clause, were not specifically 
precluded. These "grey-area" measures consisted of countries either agreeing 
"voluntarily" to limit exports in response to complaints about surges in imports 
- VERs 79 - or importing and exporting governments agreeing to limit the 
quantity of a good that would be traded - OMAs. 80 Such practices were 
effectively reinstating quotas and other trade-distorting measures that had been 
phased out and substituted with less trade-distorting tariffs through multiple 
rounds of GATT negotiations. Thus, when left unchecked, countries -
particularly those with the most powerful economies - created an end-run 
around some of the liberalisation requirements of the GATT. As a result of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, WTO members agreed to change this inefficient 
dynamic - though many others remain to be addressed - and to forego the 
right to negotiate VERs, OMAs, and the like. 81 The WTO thus serves as an 
institutional mechanism to get countries to agree to liberalisation and to 
impose consequences in the event of cheating. 
What we are seeing at present is that FT As are presenting a new prisoner's  
dilemma. The choice to enter into bilateral Ff As can be seen as  a defection of 
sorts- from the cooperative endeavour of the WTO. Everyone seems to agree 
the best collective result is to negotiate the elimination of trade barriers 
through the multilateral system. Yet under the current regime, countries see 
that there are opportunities to obtain pockets of trade liberalisation through 
FTAs, and also to have some ability to shield sensitive industries from quick 
liberalisation. As a result, some countries perceive their individual interests 
being maximised by going the bilateral route, if only other countries stick to 
the multilateral path. Of course due to the shifts in comparative advantage, we 
see .the "me too" effect taking place, and countries are not able to maintain the 
comparative advantages obtained through Ff As for very long. As a result, we 
increasingly see that countries are all falling into the bilateral/bilateral box, 
even though they would benefit more if all countries instead took the 
multilateral path. 
78 D A Farber and R E  Hudec, "Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause" (1994) 47 Vanderbilt L Rev 1401 ,  1405. Farber and Hudec 
argue that in the trade context, "an enforcement mechanism is required, not because it is in 
the interest of each state to defect from the agreement - economists are pretty much united 
in the view that it isn't - but because the mercantilist perspective that prevails in most 
political debate makes it seem so". Ibid, 1405. 
79 Of course, VERs were not truly voluntary and instead resulted from negotiations with the 
importing country. 
80 In essence OMAs were quite similar to VERs, but involved more explicit involvement of the 
importing government. 
8 1  See WTO Agreement on Safeguards (1994), Art l l : l(b) ( A  WTO member "shall not seek, 
take, or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or other 
similar measures on the export or import side . . .  "). 
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Country B Multilateral Bilateral 
Country A 
Multilateral Win some/win some Lose much/win much 
Bilateral Win much/lose much Win little/win little 
However, as with the classic prisoner's dilemma, countries are not being 
foolish or irrational. To the contrary, the rational decision in this situation is in 
fact to. take a bilateral approach. But while this decision is rational, it is not 
Pareto efficient. 
As a result, we are now seeing the old inefficiencies played out anew. 
Countries have replaced OMAs, VERs, and tariffs with Ff As that carve out or 
build in lengthy phase-outs for their sensitive industries and otherwise 
undermine the potential for reducing trade barriers on all goods and services 
on an MFN basis. 
IV. IS THERE A WAY 0UT OF THE PARADOX? 
What is the key to escaping the FfA paradox? Can the prisoner's dilemma be 
resolved? Studies on the prisoner's dilemma have shown that "unless the 
number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or 
some other device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests."82 However, research suggests that in repeated iterations of the 
dilemma, parties can learn to choose the most efficient outcome. When the 
exercise is repeated in multiple rounds, parties experience the detrimental 
effects of defecting and there is then an increase in cooperation. 83 Therefore, 
the key to solving the prisoner's dilemma may be to implement a sanction of 
some sort for entering into suboptimal Ff As. First, cheating - in this context 
entering into problematic Ff As - must be punished. Second, countries must 
recognise that there is in fact a credible threat that cheating will be punished. 
Finally, the punishment or sanction must be big enough to wipe out any gains 
from cheating.84 
This all suggests the need for the WTO to impose conditions that will 
change the incentive structure for countries, so that there is either a prohibition 
on, or a clear disincentive from, entering into FfAs that are not true to the 
purpose of Article XXIV. The WTO must remove the option - even if 
countries still desire it - of going the bilateral route when it is at the expense 
of the multilateral process. And to the extent countries disregard any new 
regulations designed to prevent Ff As that greatly undermine the WTO system, 
they will do so at the peril of having to defend their agreement before the 
Dispute Settlement Body. If Article XXIV is clarified and strengthened, 
presumably more cases would be brought challenging certain FfAs as being 
GATT-inconsistent. All of these steps would have the effect of changing the 
82 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1971)  2. 
83 See for example A 0 Sykes, " 'Mandatory' Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: 
Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301" (1990) 8 Bost Int'l Law J 301, 308. 
84 Ibid, 309-3 10. 
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pay-off matrix featuring in the present prisoner's  dilemma. The key is to 
change the rules such that countries no longer perceive choosing Ff As over 
the multilateral system as being in their best interest. 
This isn't to say that the WTO membership should repeal Article XXIV, or 
that Ff As should no longer be permitted. Ff As are clearly here to stay. 
However, the WTO can and should change the way Ff As are reviewed, so that 
the FfAs that are entered into are those that have the greatest potential for 
spurring on the multilateral process, and not those that, by virtue of excluding 
sensitive sectors or adding trade-dampening clauses, will hinder the process of 
multilateral trade liberalisation. 
The GATT examined FfAs and customs unions through what was called 
the working party review system. Pursuant to Article XXIV:?, parties to an 
FfA must provide to the contracting parties notification of the FfA as well as 
a plan for making the necessary reductions in trade barriers.85 Notification 
resulted in the creation of a working party which was tasked with examining 
the agreement and reporting to the WTO General Council. 86 The Council 
would then adopt the report and the contracting parties would make 
recommendations · thereon. 87 The working party review system was highly 
ineffective from the beginning. The working party tasked with reviewing the 
EEC was unable to reach agreement with the EEC countries regarding the 
compatibility of the customs union with Article XXIV. 88 Due to this impasse 
and the unwillingness of the GATT membership as a whole to derail the EEC, 
no decision was ever formally reached with respect to the EEC' s adherence to 
Article XXIV. 89 This experience laid the groundwork for continued 
indecisiveness, with the result that of the eighty working parties that examined 
FfAs for consistency with Article XXIV, only one agreement was ever found 
to be in conformity,90 and no FfAs were ever found to be not in conformity.91 
Thus the overwhelming majority of agreements came into effect without any 
consensus as to their consistency with Article XXIV. 
As a result of dissatisfaction with the ad hoc system, WTO members 
agreed at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Meeting to replace the working party 
review system with the CRTA.92 The terms of reference for the CRTA 
inc.luded examining new agreements, assessing systemic implications of Ff As, 
and making recommendations to the General Council.93 Unfortunately, the 
85 WTO, Regionalism and the World Trading System (1995) 9. 
86 The General Council is the governing body of the contracting parties (now WTO members). 
87 WTO, Regionalism and the World Trading System (1 995) 10. 
88 Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on 
RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 902-903. 
89 Ibid, 903. 
90 The only agreement ever to be found in conformity with Art XXIV is the customs union 
between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. See James H Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements 
in the GATTIWTO: Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement (2002) 131 .  
9 1  Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on 
RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 903. 
92 WTO, Decision of the General Council of6 February 1996 (WT/Ul27, Geneva, 7 February 
1996). James H Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATTIWTO: Article XXIV and the 
Internal Trade Requirement (2002) 1 3 1 .  
9 3  Mathis, ibid. 
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parties have still been unable to reach agreement as to the proper interpretation 
of Article XXIV, and as such have been unable to reach consensus about a 
single free trade agreement. The Slovakia-Czech Republic·agreement remains 
the only customs union to have received an affirmative recommendation.94 Not 
even the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
("CER"), which is considered one of the "cleanest" Ff As in existence, has 
received formal approval from the CRTA.95 The CRTA is perpetually 
hamstrung by its dependency on the consensus of the WTO membership. 
Because over a hundred Ff As have come into effect even without working 
party or CRTA approval, members have realised that the CRTA has no real 
teeth. Were the CRTA to both have and exercise the power to prohibit FfAs 
that were inconsistent with Article XXIV, we would see FfAs that more 
closely complemented rather than clashed with the multilateral system. As 
such, parties would either devote their efforts primarily to the WTO rounds, or 
would be additionally chipping away at the remaining barriers through FfAs. 
This would be a far more efficient result than what we see today. 
In light of these considerations, what can and should individual countries 
do to act in their best interests, yet avoid undermining the WTO? The ultimate 
solution to the spaghetti bowl effect and these other inefficiencies would of 
course be for all countries to reduce all tariffs to zero.96 If and when this 
occurs, FfAs will become largely redundant except for the value they provide 
in increasing linkages in areas not covered by the WT0.97 Even a removal of 
tariffs on manufactured goods would be beneficial, as it would remove the 
current problem of inconsistent practices in determining rules of origin. 98 
While WTO members are not likely to agree to remove all tariffs in the 
near future, there are other measures that· can be taken now. First, members 
should recognise that due to the "me too" effect, the comparative advantage 
benefits that result from Ff As may be short-lived. Achieving new 
commitments through a multilateral round of WTO negotiations will result in 
far more significant benefits than negotiating "catch up" FfAs. Second, 
countries should be wary about agreeing to carve-outs of specific sectors, 
WTO-plus-type protections, or lengthy phase outs for sensitive sectors. Each 
of these types of provisions may serve as models for future Ff As, thus making 
it all the more difficult to achieve across-the-board liberalisation through the 
WTO. And third, WTO members should make it a priority to clarify the terms 
94 Ibid. 
95 In the case of CER, European and American officials have reportedly told their Australian 
counterparts that the Ff A "sets too high a bar" and would raise scrutiny directed towards 
other FfAs. 
96 The Consultative Board suggests that developed countries commit to reduce all tariffs to zero 
by a certain date: Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New 
Millenium (2004) 26, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
97 See generally, C Barfield et a!, "The Multilateral System and Free Trade Agreements: What's 
the Strategy?" (2003) 37 Int'l L 805. 
98 J Crawford and R V Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements 
(2005) 18, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). The need for 
preferential rules of origin would disappear if there were no longer a tariff differential 
depending on the country from which a product originated. 
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of Article XXIV and strengthen the CRT A .  The "substantially all" requirement 
should be amended to make clear that Ff As must result in a very high level of 
coverage both qualitatively and quantitatively, such that significant carve-outs 
are no longer an option.99 In addition, members could amend Article XXIV to 
require that Ff As be made open to other countries that are willing to match the 
terms provided. 100 An open accession rule would result in increased 
consistency and would simplify expanding trade liberalisation achieved 
through Ff As. 101 This openness would light a clear path from discrete bilateral 
agreements to the more desirable lowering of barriers on a multilateral basis. 
Finally, members could give the CRT A specific guidelines for determining 
whether an Ff A satisfies the strengthened version of Article XXIV and a 
mandate to reach a decision within a set time limit. If an Ff A did not pass 
muster, it would not be treated as a valid Ff A for WTO purposes. The 
consequence could be that, if the parties nonetheless proceeded with their 
invalid Ff A, other countries could challenge the preferential market access 
provided under the FTA as a violation of MFN. Whatever measures are taken, 
countries should act sooner rather than later. There are already hundreds of 
FT As in effect, and more being negotiated all the time. The damage being 
done to the multilateral system will only increase if steps are not taken to 
reverse the current trend. 
In sum, countries are flocking to suboptimal FT As at the expense of the 
multilateral system. This dynamic must change - and soon - as it is 
undermining the ability and the will of WTO members to do the hard work 
necessary to lower trade barriers on a multilateral basis. 
99 One possibility among many would be to require coverage of at least ninety-five per cent of 
items listed in the proposed FfA partners' tariff schedules and at least ninety-five per cent of 
the value of the goods traded between the proposed partners. 
100 The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement recently negotiated among 
New Zealand, Brunei, Chile, and Singapore - termed the P4 Agreement - has such an open 
accession clause: "This Agreement is open to accession on terms to be agreed among the 
Parties, by any APEC Economy or other State. The terms of such accession shall take into 
account the circumstances of that APEC Economy or other State, in particular with respect to 
timetables for liberalisation." Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Art 
20.6.1, available online at <Www.mfat.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 October 2005). 
101 Agreements that are inherently exclusionary are more problematic because, as discussed 
above, they are discriminatory and frequently are not trade enhancing. 
